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Abstract: The rivalry between Serbia and Italy over the Adriatic region also 
involved Albania as a point of dispute. The political leaderships of both 
countries were driven by the war aim of putting an end to Austro-Hungar-
ian hegemony in south-east Europe and of preventing any other country 
from taking its place. Each of the two countries sought for some time to 
establish its influence in Albania either through a local proxy, Essad Pasha 
Toptani, or by occupying the parts of Albania considered important for its 
perceived strategic interests after the war. 
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After the London Conference of the Ambassadors of six great powers in 1912/3 and the signing of peace treaties between the warring Balkan 
states, the issue arose of establishing a government and preparing the new 
Albanian state for independent existence. In the history of international 
relations the term “Albanian question” is habitually used for a series of dip-
lomatic crises and political clashes taking place in the as yet not definitively 
delimited territory of Albania among Albanians themselves, their neigh-
bours and the great powers. The question thus concerned the political fu-
ture of the Albanian population in the central and western Balkans. The 
future fate of Albania also figured in territorial disputes between the king-
doms of Serbia and Italy over the eastern side of the Adriatic Sea during the 
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First World War and at the Paris Peace Conference. Thus this area was the 
southernmost point of the territory in dispute between the two countries 
that stretched as far north as Fiume/Rijeka and the westernmost South-Slav 
regions.1   
In the decades preceding the First World War, and especially 
in 1913/4, the main rivals for dominance over Albania were Austria-
Hungary and Italy among the great powers, as well as Greece and Serbia, 
Albania’s strongest neighbours.2 King Nicholas I of Montenegro also har-
boured ambition of expanding into the Scutari/Shkoder area and north-
ern Albania. His limited resources forced him, however, to rely on other 
countries for maintaining his own country’s influence in Albania; even so, 
Montenegro had since the end of the nineteenth century been pursuing 
a very active policy in this respect, especially among the north-Albanian 
Roman Catholic Malisors. During and after the Balkan Wars, two allies, 
Italy and Austria-Hungary, went from cooperating in Albania, when 
their joint pressure had thwarted Serbian-Greek plans for her partition, 
to an almost open conflict over influence in the newly-created country.3 
The foremost war aim of both Serbia and Italy was to supress Austro-
Hungarian influence in all of south-eastern Europe because both saw the 
Dual Monarchy as their most dangerous rival.4 The ruling elites in both 
1  D. R. Živojinović, “The War Aims of Serbia and Italy (1917)”, in Italy’s Balkan 
Strategies, ed. V. G. Pavlović (Belgrade: Institute for Balkan Studies, 2014), 141. In 
much the same way, Albania was a disputed area between Italy and Greece besides 
Epirus, parts of Anatolia and the Dodecanese, see M. L. Smith, “Venizelos Diplo-
macy, 1910–23: From Balkan Alliance to Greek-Turkish Settlement”, in Eleftherios 
Venizelos. The Trials of Statesmanship, ed. P. M. Kitromilides (Edinburgh: Edin-
burgh University Press, 2006), 160.
2  M. Ekmečić, Ratni ciljevi Srbije (Belgrade: Prosveta, 19902), 144.
3  H. Afflerbach, Der Dreibund. Europäische Großmacht und Alianzpolitik vor 
dem Ersten Weltkrieg (Vienna: Böhlau Wien, 2002), 750–755; D. T. Bataković, Srbija 
i Balkan. Albanija, Bugarska i Grčka 1914–1918 (Novi Sad: Prometej, and Belgrade: 
RTS, 2016), 158.
4  Italy’s main rival in the Adriatic was neither Serbia nor Montenegro nor even 
Greece, but rather Austria-Hungary – see R. J. B. Bosworth, Italy, the Least of the 
Great Powers: Italian foreign policy before the First World War (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 235–236 – and vice versa, Italy was the most important rival 
of the Dual Monarchy in Albania – see M. B. Fried, Austro-Hungarian War Aims in 
the Balkans during World War I (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 26; S. R. 
Williamson, Jr., Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War (London: 
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countries saw the solution to this problem in gaining control over the ter-
ritories deemed strategically important, above all in the western Balkans. 
As a result, the Albanian question figured prominently in Serbo-Italian 
relations during the First World War. Gaining control over Albania would 
have meant a decisive triumph for Italian foreign policy since it had for at 
least two previous decades been one of the key territories to which both 
Italy and Austria-Hungary laid claim.
Serbia’s pretensions to northern Albania had a relatively short histo-
ry, in which Italy also played a part. When in 1912, during the war of the 
Balkan League against the Ottoman Empire, the Serbian forces took some 
coastal areas in northern and central Albania, Italy and Austria-Hungary’s 
joint diplomatic pressure forced them to withdraw. The result of the war 
was an enlarged but still landlocked Kingdom of Serbia, exactly what the 
Serbian government had sought to change in the First Balkan War. In other 
words, Italy’s position in Albania, compared to Serbia’s, was more stable 
both economically and politically because, pressed by her rivalry with the 
Dual Monarchy, she had developed an extensive network of schools and 
other tools necessary for creating a sphere of influence, whereas Serbia’s 
connections in Albania were quite recent and still vulnerable.5
***
During the July Crisis which preceded the outbreak of the First World War 
Albania was in a state of civil war, torn apart by a few opposing factions, 
which led to the dissolution of the International Control Commission and 
its departure from Albania in August 1914. The Commission, composed 
(in 1913) of the representatives of the great powers, had failed to achieve 
the main goals mostly because of growing disagreements between the rep-
resentatives of Austria-Hungary and Italy. There had been no final decision 
on the delimitation of Albania’s borders, nor had a stable central authority 
Macmillan, 1991), 177. Hence Italian Foreign Minister San Giuliano’s stance of op-
posing Austria-Hungary’s expansion unless counterbalanced by territorial com-
pensations for Italy, see Giordano Мerlicco, “Italy and the Austro-Serbian Crisis of 
July 1914”, in Serbian-Italian Relations: History and Modern Times, eds. S. Rudić and 
A. Biagini, 128–129.
5  On the Austro-Italian rivalry in Albania see H. D. Schanderl, Die Albanienpo-
litik Österreich-Ungarns und Italiens 1877–1908 (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 
1971).
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been created, which had serious consequences for the new country’s inter-
nal situation.6 
Albania was fragmented into several regions controlled by figures 
such as Prenk Bib Doda, the Mirdita leader in the north, or Essad Pasha 
Toptani and Ahmed Bey Zogu, Muslim landowners in central Albania, or 
the leaders of rebels against Prince Wilhelm of Wied.7 Various local lords, 
influential landowning beys, northern tribes and ever more influential 
Albanian nationalists fought for dominance in the country, trying to win 
the support of one or another foreign power. All of them were involved 
in the conflict between the conservative pro-Ottoman faction of central 
Albania and the Austro-Hungarian-backed government of Prince Wied. 
Wied’s regime collapsed and in early September 1914 he left the Albanian 
capital Durres.8 Internal fighting, accompanied by a series of military in-
terventions and occupations by Italy, Serbia, Greece, Montenegro, Austria-
Hungary and Bulgaria, continued until 1920.
***
Having failed to obtain access to the Adriatic Sea before the First World 
War, the Serbian government and its leading figure at the time, Nikola 
Pašić, who usually held the post of prime minister or foreign minister, 
sought to achieve the best possible solution to the Albanian question, the 
understanding of which varied with the changing international situation. 
This means that a “Serbian solution” had to take into account both Serbia’s 
own strength and the decisions of the great powers. Plans ranged from par-
titioning the territory of Albania to eliminating her as a political entity, 
with the future border of Serbia moved southward and set either along the 
6  P. Bartl, Albanci: od srednjeg veka do danas (Belgrade: Clio, 2001), 169, transl. 
from the German original: Albanien: vom Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart (Regtens-
burg: Pustet, 1995).
7  M. Schmidt-Neke, Enstehung und Ausbau der Königsdiktatur in Albanien (1912–
1939) (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1987), 30. Of course, this list is not complete. 
There were also local powerful figures with dubious allegiances in cities such as 
Lezhe or Elbasan. 
8  Wied’s downfall was the result of Italy’s policy of supporting Essad Pasha 
Toptani and north-Albanian Muslim rebels. See D. T.  Bataković, “Essad Pasha 
Toptani, Serbia and the Albanian Question (1915–1918)”, in Italy’s Balkan Strategies, 
ed. V. G. Pavlović (Belgrade: Institute for Balkan Studies, 2014), 160; Fried, Aus-
tro-Hungarian War Aims, 26.
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river Mat or the river Shkumbin. The minimum demand in Serbia’s plans 
was a strategic change to the borders established at the London Conference 
in 1912/3. Yet another outcome considered acceptable by the Serbian gov-
ernment was an Albanian government under Serbia’s protection.9
Italy, being a great power, had a variety of ambitions in the 
Mediterranean. Italian ruling circles discussed Corsica, Malta, Nice and 
Savoy, the establishing of dominance in Montenegro and Albania, the gain-
ing of territory in Ottoman Anatolia, plans for North Africa.10 Among all of 
Italy’s war aims, however, the eastern Adriatic coast was her first priority.11
The disputed and potentially conflict hotspot area in the context of 
Serbian and Italian territorial pretensions was central Albania. The Italian 
government did not object to Serbia’s and Montenegro’s limited expansion 
into northern Albania as long as her own ambition to occupy Valona/Vlore 
and the strategically important island of Saseno/Sazan was not called into 
question. Each country had its own plans for the future of a mostly Muslim 
central Albania dominated by former officials of the Ottoman imperial ad-
ministration.12 
Albania was important to both Italy and Serbia also because of po-
tential military operations in wartime itself. The pro-Austrian forces in 
Albania consisted mostly of prominent figures from the former Vilayet of 
Kosovo, such as Hasan Prishtina, Bajram Curri and Isa Boletini. They re-
cruited and organized units which, supplied by the Dual Monarchy with 
arms and money, made raids into Serbia in the course of 1914 and 1915.13 
9  Ekmečić, Ratni ciljevi, 372; A. Mitrović, Srbija u I svetskom ratu (Belgrade: 
Stubovi kulture, 2004), 194–195 (an English edition: Serbia’s Great War 1914–1918 
(London: C. Hurst & Co., 2007; Purdue University Press, 2007). Principles under-
lying Serbia’s war aims were set forth in the Niš Declaration which was made public 
on 7 December 1914. Its text is available in Dokumenti o postanku Kraljevine Srba, 
Hrvata i Slovenaca 1914–1919, ed. F. Šišić (Zagreb: Naklada Matice Hrvatske, 1920), 
doc. 8.
10  Decisions for War, 1914–1917, eds. R. F. Hamilton and H. H. Herwig (Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 188.
11  D. R. Živojinović, U potrazi za imperijom: Italija i Balkan početkom XX veka: 
studije i rasprave (Belgrade: Albatros Plus, 2013), 18.
12  M. Bucarelli, “Allies or Rivals? Italy and Serbia during the First World War”, in 
The Serbs and the First World War 1914–1918, ed. D. R. Živojinović (Belgrade: Ser-
bian Academy of Sciences and Arts), 248–251.
13  Mitrović, Srbija, 183–192.
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Neutralisation of these units was important for Serbia in order for her army 
to be able to resist Austro-Hungarian attacks from the north and west. 
Moreover, their raids could serve as an excuse for Serbian extension into 
Albania. For Italy, controlling Valona seemed vital not only for naval war-
fare in the Adriatic but also for controlling the Adriatic after the war. When 
considering the further evolution of the two countries’ war aims, it should 
be borne in mind that the first war year was difficult for both. Italy would 
have hardly survived the first war year had the Austro-Hungarian forces 
not been engaged in Russia as well.14 Serbia, on the other hand, emerged 
victorious from the battles of Cer and the Kolubara, but they took their 
toll, and she entered the year 1915 exhausted and gripped by a typhus ep-
idemic.15 Even so, her two victorious battles brought a lull in her fighting 
with Austria-Hungary until October 1915,16 which gave her some leeway 
for engagement in Albania.
A goal of Sidney Sonnino, successor of San Giuliano in the office of 
Italian foreign minister, was to change what he saw as his country’s inferior 
position in relation to Austria-Hungary. His intention was to negotiate the 
best possible terms for Italy’s entry into the war on the side of the Entente 
in return for abandoning her pre-war alliance with the Central powers.17 
Besides, he believed that every war effort would be rendered meaningless 
if Austro-Hungary was simply replaced by an ambitious South-Slav state. 
Italian Prime Minister Vittorio Emanuele Orlando would be of a similar 
view at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, when he stated that everything 
would be as unsatisfactory as it had been if Austro-Hungary was simply 
replaced by Yugoslavia on the other side of the Adriatic. Similar fears trou-
bled the Serbian leadership. Prime Minister Nikola Pašić’s concern, which 
he expressed to the Russian Minister to Serbia, Prince Trubetskoi, as early 
as August 1915, was that Serbia would shake off the “Austrian yoke” only to 
fall into Italian hands. It was in these fears on both sides that lay the roots of 
growing mutual distrust in Serbian-Italian relations during the war years. 
14  Bataković, Srbija i Balkan, 32–37.
15  Gooch, The Italian Army and the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), 97.
16  Bataković, Srbija i Balkan, 37.
17  On the 1914 decision of the Italian government to remain neutral, see Affler-
bach, Der Dreibund, 845.
191 D. Fundić, The Albanian Question in Serbian-Italian Relations 1914–1918
***
In late October 1914, Italy, still as a neutral country, sent a sanitary mission 
to Valona which was to serve as a stepping-stone in her expansion plans or, 
as Prime Minister Antonio Salandra put it, as “a more concrete affirmation 
of our influence”.18 This move was meant to send a clear message to the other 
great powers that Italy was not going to let dominance over Albania slip to 
any of them or to Serbia or Greece. Italy, taking advantage of the Entente’s 
being careful not to do anything that would incline her to remain in the camp 
of the Central powers, used every opportunity to push through her policy.19 
In November 1914 the Serbian government failed in its attempt to obtain the 
Allied powers’ support for intervening in Albania to consolidate the position 
of Essad Pasha Toptani, on whom it relied in pursuing her own national in-
terests.20 While Serbia was trying to get the Allies’ support, Italy was negoti-
ating with both camps of the warring European powers in order to effect the 
transformation of the sanitary mission into the occupation of Valona and 
the island of Saseno, in which she succeeded by the end of December 1914.21 
Italian policy in Albania was limited by a disagreement between General 
Cadorna, chief of staff of the Italian Army, and Sidney Sonnino, Italian for-
eign minister, because the former opposed Italian involvement in Albania as 
detrimental to the Italian war effort.22 The situation in the case of Serbia was 
much the same, because Prime Minister Pašić’s proposal for a military re-
sponse to the Italian occupation of Valona was rejected by Cadorna’s Serbian 
counterpart, Vojvoda (Field-Marshal) Putnik.23 These military decisions 
brought the two countries’ policies to a relative standstill between January 
18  Salandra to Lori, Rome, 21 Oct. 1914, Documenti Diplomatici Italiani [hereafter 
DDI], ser. V, vol. II, doc. 9; Gooch, The Italian Army, 70.
19  N. Guy, “The Albanian question in British policy and Italian intervention, Au-
gust 1914–1915”, Diplomacy and Statecraft 18 (2007), 118.
20  D. Janković, Srbija i jugoslovensko pitanje 1914–1915 (Belgrade: Institut za savre-
menu istoriju, 1973), 167.
21  The island of Saseno was seen as the “Gibraltar of the Adriatic”, see R. J. 
Bosworth, “Italy and the End of the Ottoman Empire”, in The Great Powers and the 
End of the Ottoman Empire, ed. M. Kent (), 62.
22  H. J. Burgwyn, “Italy’s Balkan Policy 1915–1917. Albania, Greece and the Epirus 
Question”, Storia delle relazioni internazionali 2 (1986), 8.
23  Mitrović, Srbija, 193.
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and April 1915, when the secret negotiations between Italy and the Entente 
powers ended with a treaty.24
Serbia’s and Italy’s Albanian policy can be analysed on the basis of 
their respective relations with Essad Pasha Toptani, a former Ottoman 
army officer and member of a wealthy and influential central-Albanian 
landowning family, in whom both countries invested their political influ-
ence and material resources for their own ends.25 Appointed defence min-
ister in Prince Wied’s government, Essad Pasha played one of the leading 
roles in Albanian politics.26 In the early months of the First World War, 
Toptani had the support of and agreements with both Serbia and Italy. And 
he did need support because he was constantly in conflict with his for-
mer allies – the rebels against Prince Wied. In November 1914 he received 
a new portion of financial aid from Italy and in return was expected to 
resist any form of Austro-Hungarian influence in Albania.27 But he also 
had important arrangements with Serbia. Under two separate agreements, 
one signed in Niš on 17 September 1914,28 the other in Tirana on 28 July 
1915,29 he took on the obligation to pursue, diplomatically and militarily, a 
policy of close ties between Albania and Serbia which, among other things, 
involved the incorporation of some border areas of Albania into Serbia and 
the formation of a union between the two countries after the war. The posi-
tion of the Albanian ruler, either as president or monarch, was reserved for 
Essad Pasha himself.30 
24  Janković, Srbija i jugoslovensko pitanje, 169–171.
25  Ekmečić, Ratni ciljevi, 144.
26  In the first years of Albania’s existence as a state, 1912–1914, he was the main 
rival of Ismail Kemal’s Valona government for the position of highest authority in 
the country. 
27  Ekmečić, Ratni ciljevi, 385. Serbia also played the card of supporting Ahmed 
Bey of Mat, future King Zogu, Ekmečić, Ratni ciljevi, 389; Bataković, Srbija i Bal-
kan, 180–184.
28  The text of the agreement is available in S. Rahimi, “Marrëveshjet e qeverise 
serbe me Essat pashe Toptanit gjate viteve 1914–1915”, Gjurmime Albalologjike 6 
(1975), 125–127.
29  Bataković, Srbija i Balkan, 177–179.
30  Bataković, “Essad Pasha”, 161. The assistance provided by the Serbian govern-
ment was diverse. For example, in early July 1915, Toptani’s forces were supplied 
with 2,000 uniforms and he was given permission to recruit men from among 
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The state of relations between Serbia and Italy may be read from the 
concluding article of the Tirana agreement, under which Essad Pasha en-
gaged that he would inform the Serbian government as soon as he should 
have learnt about possible Italian plans for the occupation of Durazzo/
Durres, and prevent that from happening.31 Essad Pasha’s political tactic of 
balancing between Serbia and Italy in order to avoid becoming completely 
dependent on either of the two caused a growing distrust between Serbia 
and Italy. He made use of their rivalry to obtain more substantial financial 
support. When asking Serbia for money, he would give to understand that 
he would turn to Italy if Serbia was unable to help. Of course, the Serbian 
government chose to supply the money.32 In June 1915, Italian Minister in 
Durazzo Aliotti reported that Essad Pasha counted on the Italian army to 
keep Serbian troops out of Albania while calling on Serbia early the same 
year to intervene in Albania in his favour.33  
The central place in Serbian-Italian relations as regards Albania and, 
more generally, the Adriatic, was held by the secret Treaty of London34 
signed, after long negotiations, on 26 April 1915, by which Italy abandoned 
the Triple Alliance and pledged to enter the war on the side of the Entente. 
The terms of the treaty envisaged Albania as a small, predominantly Muslim 
state centred on Tirana and Elbasan and having the status of an Italian pro-
tectorate with Rome having full control over its foreign affairs. Under arti-
cle six, Italy was to annex Valona and the island of Saseno, the key strategic 
point which enabled full control of the Adriatic. If the decisions concerning 
Italian territorial gains were honoured, Italy would not object to the di-
Albanians in Serbia, see Zapisnici sednica Ministarskog saveta Srbije 1915–1918, eds. 
D. Janković and B. Hrabak (Belgrade: Arhiv Srbije, 1976), doc. 9.  
31  Thus Essad Pasha informed the Serbian government that he had learnt that 
Italy was going to expand her zone of occupation in August 1915, Zapisnici, doc. 27.
32  Zapisnici, doc. 51. Expectedly enough, in the course of 1914 and 1915 Toptani 
received aid from Italy as well, see Hrabak, “Vojne i političke prilike u Albaniji u 
Prvom svetskom ratu”, Arbanaške studije, vol. IV (Belgrade: Arhivar, 2006), 15.
33  Hrabak, “Vojne i političke prilike”, 21.
34  Balkanski ugovorni odnosi I, ed. M. Stojković (Belgrade: Službeni list SRJ, 1998), 
doc. 179; D. R. Živojinović, “Srbija i Londonski pakt 1915. godine”, in Dva veka 
moderne srpske diplomatije, eds. Č. Popov, D. R. Živojinović and S. G. Marković 
(Belgrade: Balkanološki institut and Institut za evropske studije), 159–171. See also 
V. G. Pavlović, De la Serbie vers la Yougoslavie. La France et la naissance de la You-
goslavie 1878–1918 (Belgrade: Institute des Etudes balkaniques, 2015), 220–229.
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vision of northern and southern Albania among Montenegro, Serbia and 
Greece. In other words, the chief territorial gain in the eastern Adriatic 
that the Treaty promised to Italy was such that it would have ensured her 
unquestionable supremacy after the war.35 Once the Serbian government 
learnt the perplexing but essentially accurate news about the agreement 
reached in London, the idea of occupying central Albania was back on the 
table.36 Essad Pasha’s calls for help sent in May 1915 were used as an ex-
cuse for preparing troops for intervention in Albania.37 In late May, the 
Serbian troops crossed the border, occupying Elbasan on 4 June and Tirana 
a week later in Essad Pasha’s name.38 It was after this intervention that the 
abovementioned Tirana agreement was concluded, by which the Albanian 
state in central Albania was practically to become a Serbian protectorate.39 
The Italian response came soon enough. Italian Minister in Durazzo Aliotti 
reported in the course of October 1915 on Essad Pasha’s weak position 
and urged for Italian military intervention. The Italian army responded. In 
November 1915, while Serbia’s defence against a new invasion by the Central 
powers, now joined by Bulgaria as a new ally, was collapsing, an Italian di-
vision disembarked in Valona and a brigade in Durazzo.40 Discontent in 
Serbian-Italian relations kept mounting. Sidney Sonnino had it relayed to 
the Serbian Minister to Italy, Mihailo Ristić, that Serbia’s actions in Albania 
were hostile towards Italy, so much so that Serbia might just as well have 
been Austria’s ally.41 
35  The Treaty of London marked the beginning of a cold, diplomatic, war between 
Rome and Belgrade. See Bucarelli, “Allies or Rivals?”, 248.
36  B. Hrabak, “Elaborat srpskog Ministarstva inostranih dela o pripremama 
srpske okupacije severne Albanije 1915. godine”, Godišnjak Arhiva Kosova 2–3 
(1966–1967), 21–22.
37  Janković, Srbija i jugoslovensko pitanje, 172–175.
38 The Allies, now joined by Italy, protested strongly because they were interested 
in the implementation of the Treaty of London, see Mitrović, Srbija, 194; Bataković, 
Srbija i Balkan, 175; Hrabak, “Elaborat”, 24.
39  Mitrović, Srbija, 193.
40  Burgwyn, “Italy’s Balkan Policy”, 14–16.
41  Bucarelli, “Allies or Rivals”, 258–259.
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***
Serbia’s military defeat and Italy’s failed expedition in central Albania en-
abled the Austro-Hungarians to advance further south. In January and 
February 1916, following the capitulation of Montenegro, Austria-Hungary 
took Scutari, Tirana, Elbasan (jointly with the Bulgarians) and Durazzo.42 
Albania remained divided into three occupation zones until 1918: the 
largest, Austro-Hungarian, in northern and central Albania; the Italian in 
Valona with its hinterland; and the French zone centred on Korçe. The oc-
cupation years were marked by their more or less unsuccessful attempts to 
win the support of Albanian elites, which, however, were more and more 
enthusiastic about the ideas of Albanian nationalism and nation-state.43 
During this forced intermission in Serbian-Italian relations as regards 
Albania, Italy devoted herself to pushing Greece out of Epirus. In 1917, 
however, the rivalry broke out again, and with even higher tensions.44 
All decisions made in those years reflect the determination of both 
Italy and Serbia not to give up their respective agendas.45 In February 1917 
Nikola Pašić sent a memorandum to Serbia’s diplomatic representatives – 
with the caveat not to show it to the Allies – about the government’s aspira-
tion for setting the border with Albania along the river Mat, which would 
make it possible for Serbia to annex the north of the country with Scutari.46 
The Serbian government also sought to pave the way for Essad Pasha’s return 
to power so that all of Albania could be included in its sphere of influence. 
Italian ambitions had grown from occupying Valona and Saseno to gaining 
dominance over all of Albania. The proclamation read by Italian General 
Ferrero in Argirocastro/Argyrokastro on 3 June 1917 spoke of an indepen-
dent Albania under Italian protection.47 The issuance of the Proclamation 
42  Hrabak, “Vojne i političke prilike”, 25.
43  Bartl, Albanci, 172–178.
44  Burgwyn, “Italy’s Balkan Policy”, 28–38.
45  Živojinović, “War Aims of Serbia and Italy”, 140.
46  Mitrović, Srbija, 443. Serbia suspected that Italy was setting the stage for estab-
lishing control over central and northern Albania through her connections in the 
Roman Catholic Mirdita tribe, see doc. 195 in Diplomatska prepiska srpske vlade 
1917. godine, eds. M. Zečević and M. Milošević (Belgrade: Narodno delo, 1991). 
47  “Italians flied Wied’s flag in all places of occupied Albania and Epirus. Espe-
cially solemn was the flying of the flag in Argykastro in the presence of Greek and 
Albanian citizens… The General gave a speech and said that Italy would champion 
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was prompted by the decision of the Russian government established af-
ter the Revolution of February 1917 to disclose various secret agreements, 
including the Treaty of London, of which the Albanian public had been 
unaware until the Austro-Hungarian occupation authorities had it trans-
lated into Albanian.48 After Austro-Hungary had declared an autonomous 
Albania in January 1916, and France, the Autonomous Republic of Korça in 
her zone of occupation in December the same year, Italy “raised the bar” by 
promising an independent Albania.49 Yet, to avoid colonial connotations, 
the Italian Proclamation cautiously spoke of Albania under Italian protec-
tion rather than of a protectorate.50 In the course of 1917 Italo-Serbian re-
lations went from bad to worse. Thus, on 16 June, Carlo Sforza, the Italian 
minister to the Serbian government in exile in Corfu, wrote to Sonnino that 
Serbia would never stop her anti-Italian intrigues in Albania.51 
Finally, the Italian reaction to the issuance, on 20 July 1917, of 
the Corfu Declaration – an agreement between the Serbian government 
and the Yugoslav Committee composed of South-Slav politicians from 
the principle of nationality, help the unification and independence of Albania, and 
punish those Albanians who in collusion with some foreign countries were work-
ing for their own self-interest and that she would form a special Albanian govern-
ment with these ends in mind.” It was believed that his reference to punishment 
was directed to Essad Pasha and Serbia”, see Diplomatska prepiska, doc. 202. Italy 
sought to exclude from the decision-making process concerning Albania all oth-
er parties interested in the Albanian question, see D. Šepić, Italija, saveznici i Ju-
goslovensko pitanje 1914–1918 (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1970), 208; Bataković, “Esad 
Pasha”, 166–167. The text of the Proclamation in Marković to Pašić, 23 May/5 June 
1917, Corfu, conf. А, no. 147, Arhiv Srbije [Archives of Serbia], Ministarstvo ino-
stranih dela [Ministry for Foreign Affairs], Albanski odsek [Albanian Division], 
1917, f. V. Moreover, this was a breach of the Treaty of London which only envisaged 
a “Muslim Albania”, see N. Guy, The Birth of Albania: Ethnic Nationalism, the Great 
Powers of World War I and the Emergence of Albanian Independence (London: I. B. 
Tauris, 2012), 137–138.
48  Bartl, Albanci, 176.
49  Sonnino saw it as a direct response to the French declaration, see Živojinović, 
“The War Aims of Serbia and Italy”, 141. The Serbian side feared that every possibil-
ity of advancing into Albania would be precluded if the Italians managed to be the 
first to occupy strategic positions at Ohrid, see: Diplomatska prepiska, doc. 196.
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Austria-Hungary – concerning the creation of a common state of Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes, was markedly adverse. Italy deemed Pašić’s offer of 
Trieste, Pola/Pula, western half of Istria, some Adriatic islands and Valona 
and Saseno unsatisfactory.52 Rome saw the Corfu Declaration as anti-Aus-
trian in word but anti-Italian in spirit.53 Neither Serbia nor Italy would give 
up their respective agendas even during the following year, 1918, or at the 
Peace Conference. After the breakthrough on the Macedonian (Salonika) 
front and the military victory, Pašić contemplated the occupation of north-
ern Albania as far as the river Mat in order to be able to achieve his old 
goals as well as an attempt to bring about Essad Pasha’s return to power.54 
Italy, for her part, which had occupied most of Albania, influenced the in-
stallation in late December 1918 of a pro-Italian government in Durazzo 
headed by Turhan Pasha Permeti.55 The Serbian-Italian rivalry in Albania 
would be finally settled at the Paris Peace Conference in 1918/9.
***
Since the shaping of a new map of Europe in Paris constitutes a separate 
topic, the concluding part of this article will be restricted to outlining the 
Albania-related process of making decisions by Italy and the newly-created 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SCS).
Hopeful that Italy would succeed in her attempts to put an end to 
Albania as a state, Pašić had in fact been hopeful that he would be able to 
accomplish the plan to occupy Scutari. That plan, however, gradually be-
came an issue of secondary importance.56 As a result, the official platform 
of the delegation of the Kingdom of SCS to the Paris Peace Conference was 
support to the independence of Albania within her 1913 borders, the pur-
pose of which was to offset the potential Italian sphere of influence in the 
Balkan Peninsula.57 It may be concluded therefore that, to Pašić, Albania 
52  Šepić, Italija, saveznici i Jugoslovensko pitanje, 190.
53  Bucarelli, “Allies or Rivals”, 257.
54  Bataković, “Essad Pasha”, 176.
55  Ibid. 178–179.
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was an “object of compensation” at the Paris Peace Conference. Namely, a 
different approach would have been hardly possible given that a consider-
able part of Dalmatia and most of Albania were held under occupation by 
Italian troops.58 There were attempts by the new kingdom to present the 
border on the river Drim/Drin as its minimum and on the river Mat as 
its maximum demand.59 However, US President Wilson’s opposition to the 
abolition of Albania as a state eventually led the Italian Giolitti-Sforza gov-
ernment to decide that, now that Austro-Hungary had ceased to exist, Italy 
could reduce her demands to the island of Saseno – which she needed if she 
wished to control the Adriatic – on condition that the Kingdom of SCS and 
the Kingdom of Greece did not interfere in Albanian politics.60 
The Albanian state was established definitively and decisively in 1920. 
Conducive to such an outcome was certainly the engagement of Greece in 
Anatolia, where her war with Mustafa Kemal’s Turkey was on the road to 
disaster, the preoccupation of the Kingdom of SCS with the attempts to re-
alize its claim to Rijeka, and Italy’s difficult economic situation.61 As shown 
by the subsequent course of events, the rivalries during the First World War 
were a prelude to Italian dominance in Albania. After Benito Mussolini’s 
Fascist movement took power, two Italo-Albanian treaties concluded as 
part of Italy’s intended territorial enlargement – the so-called First and 
Second Pacts of Tirana of 1926 and 1927 respectively62 – marked Italy’s re-
turn to full influence in Albania despite Kingdom of Yugoslavia’s endeavour 
to protect its own interests. These treaties were only a prelude to the final 
conquest and annexation of Albania by Italy in 1939. 
The role of the Albanian question in Serbian-Italian relations in 
1914–1918 should be looked at from the perspective of coinciding war aims 
of the two countries which sought to protect themselves against the emer-
gence of a “new Austria-Hungary”. During the war years, however, both 
increasingly perceived each other as a future Adriatic rival. The 1915 Treaty 
of London by which the Entente powers made concessions to Italy and the 
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1919–1939”, Diplomacy and Statecraft 25/4 (2014), 593.
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tions (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1966), 360.
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1917 Corfu Declaration which, as it turned out, put Serbia irrevocably on 
the road to a Yugoslav state, only strengthened the belief of the leadership 
of each country in the danger coming from the other side of the Adriatic.     
              
 

